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ABSTRACT
In spite of significant institutional and macroeconomic reforms over the last decade or two, capital
flows to developing economies remain highly volatile.  In 1996, net private capital flows to
emerging markets reached US$230 billions; by 1997 these flows had been cut in half; by 1998
halved again; and after a mild recovery during 1999, flows fell in 2000 and 2001 to slightly over
one-tenth the level of 1996. These reversals in capital flows have enormous economic and social
costs for developing economies. For “well behaved” countries, a significant share of these
fluctuations is triggered by events that are outside their direct control, and often outside the control
of emerging markets as a whole.  Building on this observation, this paper highlights some of the
desirable features of insurance and hedging instruments against capital flow volatility, and discusses








As a result of domestic and external factors, capital flows to emerging market 
economies are highly volatile. All too often, these economies experience severe financial 
distress, which in some instances lead them to the country-equivalent of bankruptcy. 
Recently, the IMF and the U.S. Treasury have come up with plans to facilitate an orderly 
restructuring of liabilities during periods of sovereigns’ distress.  The IMF advocates an 
International Bankruptcy Procedure, using Chapters 9 and 11 from U.S. municipal and 
corporate bankruptcy laws as the benchmark. The U.S. Treasury wants mandatory 
collective action clauses (CACs) on all sovereign bonds.   
However, by focusing almost exclusively on the needs of countries undergoing 
deep crises ---highly illiquid and “bankrupt” economies--- these reform proposals have 
left unaddressed a significant fraction of the costs associated with capital flows reversals. 
An important share of these costs are borne by countries that experience deep 
contractions but do not undergo full blown crises; and even for those countries that do 
fall into deep crises, many of the costs are incurred well before the run-phase of the crisis 
develops. In fact, the latter often is just the final stage of a prolonged and politically 
thorny economic period of sharply reduced access to international capital markets. Surely, 
the anticipation of a more orderly workout and access to a few credit lines should the 
crisis phase arrive, also would (by backward induction) eliminate some of the costs that 
precede these events. But this benefit is indirect only and relies on a chain of reasoning 
that requires more rationality and trust in the new system than financial markets in panic 
mode typically exhibit. Developing economies need a more direct and robust mechanism 
to deal with capital flow reversals. This is the starting point of the proposal summarized 
in this article: Emerging markets need instruments of hedging and insurance against 
capital flow reversals.  
Because of its size, this has to be primarily a market solution. In the next pages I 
sketch a few ideas about which markets could be developed and what the role of the 
International Financial Institutions (henceforth, IFIs) could be in facilitating the creation 
and functioning of these markets.  
   3
II. Australia as a Benchmark 
  In principle, one of the great virtues of financial markets is that they allow the 
borrower to decouple expenditure from temporary fluctuations in resources.  This is 
extremely important for a small country in smoothing its business cycle and preventing 
wasteful disruptions of long-term projects. A breakdown in this service is particularly 
serious for an economy still catching up with the developed world, because this typically 
makes it a net borrower, even during normal times. Unfortunately, in emerging markets 
these breakdowns occur all too frequently.  
  A comparison of the experiences of Australia and Chile during the Asian/Russian 
crises isolates the problem well. Both Australia and Chile have very open economies with 
exports that are intensive in volatile commodities. Australia has deep domestic financial 
markets and links to international financial markets. Chile, while often used as an 
example among emerging economies for its good macroeconomic policy and institutional 
development, does not have the degree of financial development and links with 
international financial markets that Australia has.   
  The story of Australia during that Asian/Russian crisis is a textbook one. With 
most of its neighbors crumbling, its terms of trade experienced a significant decline. 
Seeing the potentially recessionary consequences of such a decline, the Central Bank of 
Australia loosened monetary policy. At the end of the day, neither consumers nor firms 
altered their plans. The entire adjustment was absorbed by a current account deficit that 
rose temporarily from 2 to 6 percent of GDP, and was financed by an increase in capital 
inflows.  
  The story of Chile has a similar beginning but a very different conclusion.  As its 
terms of trade (essentially, the price of copper) deteriorated, Chile initially attempted to 
smooth things with macroeconomic policy, especially fiscal policy. But as the external 
conditions worsened, Chile’s international capital markets began tightening. Despite very 
low levels of external debt, a current account deficit of more than 6 percent began to 
worry many observers. Resident (especially foreign) banks began pulling resources out of 
the country, and the currency soon was subject to repeated attacks. Monetary policy 
could not be used to soften the impact of the decline in terms of trade because it was 
locked into fending off the speculative attacks and attempting to slow down the sharp   4
reversal in capital inflows. When all was said and done (by the end of 1999), the current 
account had turned into a surplus to accommodate the tight financial conditions and 
expenditure had declined by about 15 percent relative to its pre-shock trend. My back of 
the envelope calculations suggest that Chile’s contraction was nearly ten times larger than 
it would have been if it had been able to count on unrestricted access to international 
financial markets.
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  Many have argued that part of the Chilean adjustment problem was attributable to 
domestic policy rather than to a sudden stop in capital flows. Perhaps, but that is just a 
matter of degree of adjustment. This discussion clouds the more important point that 
prudent emerging economies often experience severe precautionary recessions when the 
possibility of an open crisis is too close for comfort. These deep precautionary recessions 
are part of the cost of living in an environment of volatile capital flows.  They may be 
less “spectacular” than open crises are, but cumulatively (across countries and time) they 
account for a significant fraction of the costs of capital flows’ volatility. Moreover, open 
crises often are preceded by long periods of precautionary recessions. And, at times, it is 
the social and political unrest that these periods cause that ends up triggering the full 
blown crises. If one could smooth these precautionary recessions, many of the crises 
would be prevented as well. 
III. Macro-Insurance 
Even before reaching the degree of development of Australia, emerging market 
economies could respond to external shocks nearly as smoothly as Australia does. But in 
order to do so, they need access to hedging and insurance instruments to guard against the 
disastrous events caused by volatile capital flows. For now, these economies are self-
insuring through costly accumulation of large international reserves and stabilization 
funds. Most individuals would be “underinsured” if they had to leave a million dollars 
aside for a potential automobile collision and the liabilities that would follow, rather than 
buying insurance against such event; countries are no different.   Underinsurance is what 
greatly amplifies these countries’ recessions.  
 
                                                 
2 See Caballero (2001, 2003).   5
III.1 Hedging Markets 
  Let us return to our main example, Chile. It does not take much insight to notice 
that its deep recessions and crises are linked closely to sharp declines in the price of 
copper. By now, this is an accepted reality for Chileans and foreigners alike. This needs 
not be the case, though. As I argued earlier, during extreme events the Chilean 
contractions are many times larger than they ought to be. The problem is not in the 
wealth impact of a decline in the price of copper, Chile’s main export, but rather in the 
many rational and irrational reactions that such a decline generates on the part of 
domestic and foreign investors. It is the capital flows reversal that is behind the 
“disaster.”  In this context, it is apparent that Chile would benefit if it could insure or 
hedge against these disasters and that an instrument contingent on the price of copper 
would provide significant help along this dimension. (Actually, an even better instrument 
would be indexed to the price of copper and the high-yield spread.
3) 
  But, don’t Chile and other commodity-exporter economies already do this through 
derivative markets? And doesn’t the CCFL at the IMF provide some of that insurance as 
well? No. What CODELCO (Chile’s state Copper company) and PEMEX (Mexico’s state 
Oil company) and others do is to hedge some of the short-run revenue impact of 
fluctuations in the corresponding spot prices; in particular, they attempt to stabilize the 
impact of commodity price changes on the government’s revenue. The CCFL does some 
of the same for poor economies. But this means stabilizing the daily “wiggles” and the 
direct effect of commodity prices on income flows, not the infrequent but much larger 
recessions triggered by the perverse reactions of capital markets to sharp declines in 
commodity prices and other distress indicators. Surely, hedging the income flows solves 
part of the financial shock by stabilizing the country’s “collateral.”  But the markets’ 
reactions to the price of the country’s main commodity signal, especially when it comes 
at times of tight international financial markets, seems much larger than what country-
collateral models (with a fixed share of wealth as collateral) can explain.   
Hedging the financial mechanism behind macroeconomic disasters is a bigger 
problem (perhaps ten times larger?) than what these countries now do, or what 
                                                 
3 See Caballero (2003) for a proposal of this nature, and Caballero and Panageas (2003) for a formal 
quantitative framework to help designing these hedging strategies.   6
conventional commodity-derivative markets can absorb at this time. For example, Chile 
could eliminate most ---if not all-- of its deep recessions by embedding into its external 
bonds a long-term put option, yielding US$6-8 billion when the price of copper falls by 
more than two standard deviations for a few months. Of course, this example is only 
meant to be illustrative. The optimal design of such bonds would have other 
contingencies (including the high yield spread), several tranches, and take into account 
any possibility of (limited) price manipulation.  
  How much could the insurance component of the bond cost? If it was fairly priced, 
it could cost about $500 million (lump sum).
4 This is surely much less than the savings 
from the reduction in sovereign risk that would be attainable in the absence of the 
possibility of external crises, or the additional borrowing costs paid by the country to 
avoid short-run borrowing. And, it is certainly much cheaper than the precautionary 
recessions and other imperfect preventive measures that Chile currently undertakes, and 
for which it is praised. 
  But, of course, if Chile were to go to the markets to place such bonds, they would 
cost Chile far more than “fair” price. Today, there is no natural market for such 
instruments, and the corresponding derivatives markets would not suffice to cover the 
position of the writer of the option.  
This situation can change, very much as the market for (natural) catastrophe-
bonds in developed economies has changed over the last decade. The IFIs could foster 
this development. They could force troubled economies to swap their debt for contingent 
bonds and could subsidize well-behaved countries to do so voluntarily, taking the lead. 
Just as the restructuring of the bank loans caught in the debt crisis of the 1980s led to the 
development of the bond market for emerging economies, perhaps the forthcoming 
restructuring of Argentina’s sovereign bonds can be used as an opportunity to create 
some markets for contingent bonds. And as the bond markets begin to reopen for the best 
emerging economies, this can be an opportunity for the IFIs to encourage and help them 
to restructure their liabilities with built-in contingencies.   
  Is Chile unique in terms of the causes of its external crises, and thus not a useful 
benchmark? Not really. It is true that Chile is very special in terms of the great precision 
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of its capital-flow-reversal indicators. But most emerging economies have some 
indicators that could form the basis for such a strategy. For example, in the case of 
Mexico, a combination of the price of oil and U.S. GDP growth would be a good starting 
point; or Brazil, a high-yield index together with the price of coffee; Russia could build 
on the price of oil and a high-yield index; Korea on the price of semiconductors and the 
NASDAQ; and so on.
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Finally, it is important to stress that these markets are not aimed at solving crises 
caused by domestic factors. The insurance and hedging instruments are to be contingent 
on factors that are not controlled too easily by the individual country. Otherwise, moral 
hazard and specific knowledge of the countries become relevant issues, and that requires 
more expensive and scarce informed-capital. Issuing external debt in local currency, 
while extremely appealing on insurance grounds, is unlikely to provide the solution in the 
magnitude required, precisely because it fails this requirement.   
 
III.2 Asset Class Protection 
Who in the private sector could provide the insurance and become the hedging 
counterpart? The most obvious answer is the specialists in emerging markets. This is a 
starting point but is not ideal as a long term solution. Specialists are needed for 
information-intensive funding. Their information is particularly valuable when a country 
is in distress and nobody else wants to fund it. If specialists were to be the insurance 
providers, then they would see their resources shrink precisely when they are needed the 
most. This would not only curtail their ability to arbitrage (and finance) the high-return 
opportunities that a country in distress offers, but also could create the potential for 
“contagion” and collapses of the “asset class.”
6   
Since the hedging and insurance instruments I have discussed here are contingent 
on observable variables -- such as the price of copper and oil, developed economies’ 
GDP, high-yield spreads, etc. -- there is no need for emerging markets or country-specific 
expertise to invest in such instruments. These risks can be decoupled entirely from the 
                                                 
5 Interestingly, among the countries involved in the recent wave of crises one observes that the terms of 
trade of Thailand, Korea, Russia (especially), Brazil, Turkey and Argentina, declined sharply before and 
during their corresponding periods of turmoil. 
6 See Krishnamurthy (2003) for a model of amplification and shortages in insurance capital.   8
risks of the underlying emerging economy issuer. One structure that would allow for such 
decoupling is Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO). A CDO could purchase a 
diversified portfolio of emerging markets’ contingent bonds and issue several tranches of 
bonds. The most senior of these bonds could absorb the explicit contingency but not the 
default risk.  Specialists could take the latter through the mezzanine and subordinated 
debt/equity tranches. Ideally, global pension funds and insurance companies would invest 
on the senior tranches and hence provide the insurance against shocks that do not depend 
on the country’s actions. 
The literature emphasizes moral hazard and other deliberate actions by 
governments as a source of market segmentation and the need for specialists. But there is 
a more basic and pervasive reason for specialists: lack of understanding of the workings 
of developing economies and fears about local policymakers’ competence. This is yet 
another reason for why local-currency-denominated debt is unlikely to catch the attention 
of broad markets for now.  
Emerging markets (EM) CDOs already exist ---although, as far as I know, not 
with the contingency that is at the core of this proposal--- but they are in their infancy and 
undervalued. They typically require significantly more equity and are able to generate far 
fewer prime tranches than comparable U.S. high yield backed CDOs. The IFIs could play 
a role here as well, perhaps by directly investing in the subordinate-debt/equity tranche of 
these new Contingent-EM CDOs. Ex-post assistance lending could be done through the 
CDOs as well. These investments not only would yield direct benefits to emerging 
markets but also would be highly leveraged by the private sector --- a goal in itself in all 
the recent IFIs-reform reports.
7 In addition, the IFI’s participation in such activity would 
help to reduce the current undervaluation of this asset-backed investment by improving 
the emerging markets’ expertise and the information available to the CDO’s asset 
managers, as well as the monitoring of these managers. The IFIs also could use the 
mandates of the CDOs they invest in, to incentivize good reporting and accounting 
standards from emerging markets’ corporations and governments.      
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This structure also would have the virtue of leveraging the informed investors’ 
capital without destroying their incentives in the process -- something akin to the 
insurance and reinsurance split in the catastrophe insurance market. 
  
IV. Final Remarks 
In many instances, crises are non-contractible. They may arise from totally 
unexpected events or from domestic misbehavior and blunders. Adequately managed, a 
country’s bankruptcy can be thought of as an ex-ante insurance arrangement for these ill-
specified non-contractible shocks. 
However, the thesis of this proposal is that there is a lot more that is potentially 
contractible than seems to have been acknowledged. Even in the best managed emerging 
economies, aggregate risk management is being done with stone-age instruments and 
methods. With contingent markets: a) many crises would be stopped well before they 
develop; b) the costly self-insurance measures and deep precautionary recessions 
experienced by prudent emerging market economies would be reduced significantly; and 
c) much of this would be done by the private rather than the official sector.  
Unfortunately, there are too many free-rider problems for these markets to emerge 
without a concerted effort. And once this happens, it also will be essential to ensure that 
the new insurance is not undone by the local government and private sector. This peril 
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